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Note 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. SHROPSHIRE: TRYING TO 
SHOEHORN POLICE INTRADEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY 
FILES INTO THE WRONG CABINET 
WAYNE HEAVENER∗
In Montgomery County v. Shropshire,
 
1 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals considered whether two police officers’ intradepartmental dis-
ciplinary files were exempt from disclosure to the Montgomery Coun-
ty Inspector General, pursuant to the Maryland Public Information 
Act (“MPIA”).2  The court held that the officers’ Internal Affairs Divi-
sion (“IAD”) files were “personnel files” under the MPIA, not “investi-
gations,” and therefore the Montgomery County Police Department 
(“MCPD”) could deny disclosure of the records.3
The distinction between “investigations” and “personnel records” 
is significant: while investigations afford a record custodian some level 
of discretion in deciding whether to disclose,
   
4 personnel records re-
quire mandatory denials with few, very circumscribed, exceptions.5  
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the IAD files were person-
nel files; instead, the court should have found that the IAD files were 
investigations based upon the plain meaning of the MPIA.6
 
Copyright © 2012 by Wayne Heavener. 
  Con-
cerned with the practical implications of disclosing IAD files, the 
court broadened the application of the personnel records exemption 
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Steve Kiehl, Jeffrey Quinn, and Kristina Foehrkolb, for their help developing this Note.  
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continued advice and support. 
 1. 420 Md. 362, 23 A.3d 205 (2011).  
 2. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 10-611 to 10-630 (LexisNexis 2009).  
 3. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 383–84, 23 A.3d at 218.  
 4. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 6. See infra Part V.A. 
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under the MPIA beyond the scope of its plain meaning.7  The court 
could have reached the same outcome with a more logical interpreta-
tion of the statute by acknowledging that the IAD records were inves-
tigations under the MPIA,8 as substantiated by a public interest in 
confidentiality supplied by the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of 
Rights (“LEOBR”).9
I.  THE CASE 
  
The Montgomery County Inspector General requested the 
MCPD Internal Affairs Division files of officers Edward Shropshire 
and Willie E. Parker-Loan as part of an investigation into the Mont-
gomery County Police Department’s handling of a traffic accident in-
volving a member of the county’s fire and rescue service.10  Shrop-
shire and Parker-Loan were among the officers who responded to an 
accident on November 30, 2008, that involved Montgomery County 
Assistant Fire Chief Gregory J. DeHaven.11  Soon thereafter a com-
plaint was filed with the IAD,12 which prompted an investigation13 to 
examine whether Shropshire or Parker-Loan had committed any ad-
ministrative violations in conducting their accident investigation.14
 
 7. See infra Part V.B. 
  
Ultimately, the IAD found that Parker-Loan and Shropshire commit-
ted no administrative violations.  Concurrently, the Montgomery 
County Inspector General launched an investigation into the acci-
 8. See infra Part V.C. 
 9. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-101 to 3-113 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 10. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 364–65, 23 A.3d 205, 206–07 
(2011). 
 11. Id. at 366, 23 A.3d at 207. 
 12. Any form of complaint against an officer triggers an IAD investigation.  At the end 
of an IAD investigation, the involved officer’s manager examines the file and makes a writ-
ten finding regarding the allegation.  The case is concluded if the commander and IAD 
director agree the allegations are unfounded.  If the director and commander disagree, 
however, the Internal Investigative Review Panel (“IIRP”) examines the case.  If the IIRP 
affirms the allegations, it makes written findings and proposals regarding disciplinary ac-
tion to the police chief; if the IIRP finds the allegation unfounded, the case is closed.  If 
the officer is charged, the officer can either accept the charges or have an administrative 
hearing governed by the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights pursuant to Pub. Safety 
§ 3-101.  See Br. for Appellee at 4–6, Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. 
Briefs (No. 84) (Md. Jan. 3, 2011). 
 13. IAD files are indexed by an officer’s name and include complaints, the officer’s 
photograph, birth date, education level, Internal Investigation Notification to the officer, 
investigative report, investigator’s synopsis, witness transcripts, findings, and disciplinary 
recommendations.  See Br. for Appellee at 6–7, Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. Briefs (No. 
84). 
 14. Br. for Appellant at 2, Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. Briefs (No. 84). 
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dent, which included the conduct of Shropshire and Parker-Loan.  
The Inspector General submitted a request to the Chief of Police, as 
custodian of police records, for the officers’ internal investigation 
file.15
Before the requested records could be released, Shropshire and 
Parker-Loan filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment prohibit-
ing the IAD custodian from disclosing the internal investigation 
records to the Inspector General, and a writ of mandamus to prohibit 
the Inspector General from accessing the IAD files.
 
16  The officers 
predicated their action upon the theories that the IAD files were “per-
sonnel files” pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act17 and 
were confidential.18  Montgomery County then filed a motion for 
summary judgment, basing its argument on the theory that IAD files 
were “investigatory records”19 pursuant to the MPIA, and therefore 
not afforded such exemption from disclosure.20  Shropshire and 
Parker-Loan asserted that the IAD files were personnel files, or alter-
natively, that the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights protected 
their IAD files from disclosure.21
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County found that the files in 
question were investigation records under the MPIA, and that all in-
formation except “that of a personal nature” should be disclosed to 
the Inspector General.
  
22  The Circuit Court relied largely upon Mary-
land Department of State Police v. Maryland State Conference of NAACP 
Branches23 in holding that most of the information contained in the 
IAD files could be disclosed as investigation records pursuant to Sec-
tion 10-618(f) of the Maryland Code,24
 
 15. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 366–67, 23 A.3d 205, 208 (2011).  
Among those records requested were: the name, rank, assignment, and station of all police 
department employees who assisted in the November 30th accident; the duty status, shift, 
and pay status for each responding individual; and duplicates of all applicable Montgom-
ery County government and police department policies regarding the processing of an 
accident scene, documenting field sobriety tests, issuing traffic citations, and completing 
the State of Maryland Motor Vehicle Accident Report.  Id. at 367, 23 A.3d at 208. 
 with the exception of any of 
 16. Br. for Appellant at 1, Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. Briefs (No. 84). 
 17. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-618(i) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 18. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 367–68, 23 A.3d at 208. 
 19. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f). 
 20. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 368–69, 23 A.3d at 209.   
 21. Id. at 369, 23 A.3d at 209.   
 22. Shropshire v. Montgomery County, No. 319081, 2010 WL 3843051, at *1 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Apr. 30, 2010). 
 23. 190 Md. App. 359, 370–71, 988 A.2d 1075, 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), cert. 
granted Maryland State Police v. NAACP Branches, 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 (2010). 
 24. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f) (LexisNexis 2009). 
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the officers’ personal information.25  Montgomery County appealed 
the decision of the Circuit Court to the Court of Special of Appeals, 
asserting that the Inspector General should be granted access to the 
whole IAD file.26  At this point, Shropshire and Parker-Loan filed a 
writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.27  The Court of 
Appeals granted certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals could 
decide whether the MPIA or the LEOBR protected the IAD records 
from disclosure.28
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has struggled with how to classify 
records of an intradepartmental investigation under the MPIA.29  This 
particular question would render the files either largely immune from 
disclosure or subject to discretionary disclosure, depending on 
whether the court considered the files personnel records30 or investi-
gations.31  While the court has always recognized some level of confi-
dentiality conferred upon intradepartmental investigations, it re-
mained largely unclear whether that confidentiality was derived from 
the MPIA32 or the LEOBR.33
A.  The MPIA’s Personnel Records and Investigations Exceptions 
 
The MPIA stands for the general proposition that citizens “are 
entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government 
and the official acts of public officials and employees.”34  There are, 
however, exceptions to the MPIA’s general policy of disclosure,35
 
 25. Br. for Appellee at 3–4, Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. 
Briefs (No. 84) (Md. Jan. 3, 2011). 
 
 26. See Br. for Appellant at 1, Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 2010 Md. App. Ct. 
Briefs (No. 84) (Md. Nov. 19, 2011). 
 27. See id. at 1–2. 
 28. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 371, 23 A.3d 205, 207, 210 
(2011).   
 29. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 30. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 31. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. See infra Part III.C. 
 34. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-612(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  
 35. Exceptions to the MPIA fall into three classifications: exceptions in State Gov’t 
§ 10-615 permit non-disclosure if another law, outside the MPIA, prevents disclosure; the 
required denial of State Gov’t §§ 10-616 and 10-617 impose exceptions to disclosure re-
garding specific records and specific information, respectively; the permissible denials in 
State Gov’t § 10-618 provide the custodian of a document some discretion in whether to 
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which serve to either categorically bar disclosure or permit a file’s cus-
todian some degree of discretion in whether to disclose.36  The source 
of discretion comes from the text of the statute itself.37  Despite their 
distinct natures, there is a degree of commonality between mandatory 
and permissible denials.38  While a document may not fall within both 
the permissible and mandatory exceptions concurrently,39 both sta-
tute40 and case law have engendered an imperative upon the custo-
dian to sever parts of a record that are subject to disclosure from 
those that are not.41  Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that 
courts should construe these exceptions narrowly, given the MPIA’s 
broader policy in favor of disclosure.42
1.   Personnel Records Are Mandatory Denials to the General MPIA 
Rule of Disclosure of Government Records 
  With respect to police de-
partments’ intradepartmental disciplinary files, there are two relevant 
MPIA provisions that courts have interpreted as justifying the denial 
of disclosure: the “required denial” of “personnel records” and the 
“permissible denial” of “investigations.” 
Personnel records are among those denials to disclosure that the 
MPIA holds as “required.”  Section 10-616, denoted “Required de-
nials—Specific records” by the MPIA, states that “[u]nless otherwise 
provided by law, a custodian shall deny inspection of a public record, 
 
deny access.  Attorney General of Maryland, Maryland Public Information Act Manual, 3-1 
(12th ed. 2011).  
 36. STATE GOV’T §§ 10-615, 10-616, 10-617.  In particular, § 10-615 states that a “custo-
dian shall deny inspection of a public record” if enumerated by law.  STATE GOV’T § 10-
615.  Section 10-616 deals with specific records and includes the “personnel records” ex-
clusion. STATE GOV’T § 10-616(i).  Also, § 10-617 implicates the exception for specific in-
formation, and is not pertinent to the subject at hand.  Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 
420 Md. 362, 375 n.13, 23 A.3d 205, 213 n.13 (2011) (stating “Section 10-617 of the State Gov-
ernment Article, governing exemptions from disclosure for ‘specific information,’ is not im-
plicated in the present case”). 
 37. STATE GOV’T §§ 10-615 & 10-618.  Whereas the mandatory provisions state that a 
custodian “shall” deny inspection under an enumerated exception, the permissible provi-
sion states that a custodian “may” deny the inspection.  Att’y General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 
341, 353–54, 753 A.2d 1036, 1043 (2000). 
 38. Gallagher, 359 Md. at 354–55, 753 A.2d at 1043–44 (holding that “if any exemption 
under §§ 10-615, 10-616, or 10-617 is applicable to a particular record, then it must be 
withheld” and that the Court of Special Appeals “erred in holding that a person in interest 
can avoid all other exemptions under the [MPIA] simply because he is seeking disclosure 
of an investigatory file pursuant to § 10-618(f)”).  
 39. Id. at 354–55, 753 A.2d at 1043. 
 40. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-614(b)(3)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 41. Gallagher, 359 Md. at 350, 753 A.2d at 1041. 
 42. Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 544–45, 759 A.2d 249, 
262–63 (2000).  
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as provided in this section;”43
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, a custodian 
shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual, 
including an application, performance rating, or scholastic 
achievement information.   
 among those records provided under 
10-616 is “personnel records.”  Section 10-616(i) states: 
(2) A custodian shall permit inspection by: 
(i) the person in interest; or 
(ii) an elected or appointed official who supervises the work 
of the individual.44
Subsection (2) of Section 10-616 has received some definitional 
guidance from the courts,
 
45 but the MPIA itself largely provides strict 
definitional guidance respective to persons in interest46 and elected 
or appointed officials who supervise the work of the individual.47  
Contrastingly, the statute does not define the term “personnel 
record” in any particularity.48  Rather, the statute simply lists catego-
ries of documents that qualify as a personnel record.49
The Court of Appeals received its first opportunity to substantive-
ly define the meaning of “personnel records” in Kirwan v. The Di-
amondback.
 
50  In Kirwan, the University of Maryland, College Park’s 
newspaper—The Diamondback—sought, among other documents,51 
copies of parking tickets belonging to the university’s basketball 
coach, Gary Williams.52
 
 43. STATE GOV’T § 10-616(a). 
  The university denied the newspaper’s re-
 44. Id. 
 45. See Prince George’s County v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 330–31, 815 
A.2d 859, 883 (2003) (holding that the Prince George’s County Human Relations Com-
mission had no actual supervisory authority over the individual police officers).  
 46. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-611(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (narrowly de-
fining “person in interest”—in that part pertinent to personnel files—as “a person or go-
vernmental unit that is the subject of a public record or a designee of the person or go-
vernmental unit”). 
 47. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-616(i)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 48. Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 82, 721 A.2d 196, 200 (1998) (stating 
that “[t]he term ‘personnel record’ is not expressly defined in the statute”).  
 49. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-616(i)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (identifying as a 
personnel record “an application, performance rating, or scholastic achievement informa-
tion”).  
 50. 352 Md. 74, 82–83, 721 A.2d 196, 200 (1998).  
 51. The Diamondback also requested copies of all correspondence between the Universi-
ty of Maryland and the NCAA regarding a suspended student-athlete and campus parking 
violations records of basketball team members.  Id. at 79, 721 A.2d at 198–99. 
 52. Id.  The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted The Diamondback’s re-
quest for the documents.  Both parties filed appeals to the Court of Special Appeals, but 
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quest, citing the MPIA.53  In particular, the university took the posi-
tion that Coach Williams’ tickets were personnel files.54
Citing the MPIA’s broader goal of transparency,
  
55 the Court of 
Appeals held that Coach Williams’ parking tickets did not constitute 
personnel records.56  Upon noting that Section 10-616(i) enumerated 
certain examples of what would constitute a personnel record, the 
Court of Appeals explained that while this “list was probably not in-
tended to be exhaustive, it does reflect a legislative intent that ‘per-
sonnel records’ mean those documents that directly pertain to em-
ployment and an employee’s ability to perform a job.”57  The court 
observed that “[r]ecords of tickets issued by the campus police do not 
relate to Coach William’s hiring, discipline, promotion, dismissal, or 
any matter involving his status as an employee.  Accordingly, they do 
not fit within the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘per-
sonnel records.’”58  Moreover, the court found that the legislature in-
tended that the term “personnel records” should keep its “common 
sense meaning.”59  Hence, the court found that parking tickets did 
not fall within the province of “personnel records.”60
Kirwan became the measuring stick by which courts interpreted 
denials based upon the “personnel records” exception.
 
61
 
the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals could 
hear the case.  Id. 
  In subse-
quent interpretations of Kirwan, the Court of Appeals put particular 
emphasis on the concept of “personnel records” as documents “that 
directly pertain to employment and an employee’s ability to perform 
 53. Additionally, the university argued that the requested parking tickets were “finan-
cial information,” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-617(f) (1998), and that the tickets 
relating to students were protected under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.  
20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (1998).  Ultimately, the court rejected both arguments.  Kirwan, 352 
Md. at 89, 96–97, 721 A.2d at 203, 206–07.  
 54. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 89, 96–97, 721 A.2d at 203, 206–07. 
 55. Id. at 80–81, 721 A.2d at 199. 
 56. Id. at 84, 721 A.2d at 200–01. 
 57. Id. at 82–83, 721 A.2d at 200. 
 58. Id. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200 (emphasis added).  In subsequent cases, the court pre-
served the Kirwan court’s use of the word “discipline” as one of the factors indicative of a 
personnel record.  Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 547–57, 
759 A.2d 249, 264 (2000); Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 378–79, 23 
A.3d 205, 215 (2011). 
 59. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 84, 721 A.2d at 200. 
 60. Id., 721 A.2d at 200–01. 
 61. See Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 543–44, 759 A.2d at 263–64 (interpreting Kir-
wan to find that the identification of a telephone number did not amount to a “personnel 
record” under the MPIA).  See also Univ. Sys. of Md. v. Balt. Sun Co., 381 Md. 79, 98, 847 
A.2d 427, 438 (2004) (citing Kirwan to find that an employment contract setting out the 
terms and conditions of an employee’s salary was not a “personnel record”).  
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a job.”62  In using this language, the court found that neither the gov-
ernor’s scheduling records63 nor a police commander’s roster of 
names, ranks, badge numbers, dates of hire, and job assignments con-
stituted personnel records under the MPIA.64
2.   Investigations Are Permissible Denials to the General MPIA Rule 
of Disclosure of Government Records.  
  Hence, Kirwan operat-
ed as the Court of Appeals’ defining statement on what constituted a 
personnel record, and therefore a mandatory denial, under the 
MPIA. 
Documents falling within Section 10-618(f) “permissible denials” 
category are subject to the custodian’s discretion as whether to dis-
close a document.65
 
 62. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 547, 759 A.2d at 264 (quoting Kirwan, 352 Md. at 
82–83, 721 A.2d at 200).  The Court of Appeals also placed emphasis upon the following 
language of Kirwan: “records which ‘do not relate to [the employee’s] hiring, discipline, 
promotion, dismissal, or any matter involving his status as an employee . . . do not fit with-
in the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘personnel records.’”  Id. (quoting Kir-
wan, 352 Md. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200).  The Court of Special Appeals arguably put greater 
emphasis upon Kirwan’s use of “discipline,” as opposed to a broader document-occupation 
relationship.  Dep’t of State Police v. Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches, 190 Md. App. 
359, 374–75, 988 A.2d 1075, 1084 (2010), cert. granted Maryland State Police v. NAACP 
Branches, 415 Md. 38 (2010) (interpreting Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 547, 759 A.2d 
at 264).  See infra Part II.B. 
  The text of the statute makes clear that “[u]nless 
otherwise provided by law,” the custodian has discretion to deny in-
spection when the “custodian believes that inspection . . . would be con-
 63. Office of the Governor 360 Md. at 547, 759 A.2d at 264 (finding that requested tele-
phone records did not amount to personnel records).  In Office of the Governor, agents of 
the Washington Post requested telephone and scheduling records of Governor Parris 
Glendening and his staff over a two-year period.  The requested telephone records in-
cluded all phones in the Governor’s Mansion, State House office, Annapolis annex office, 
Washington and Baltimore offices, and cellular and car phones.  The requested schedul-
ing records included all of the governor’s calendars over a two-year period, indicating per-
sons, times, dates, and locations.  The Office of the Governor provided the newspaper with 
the aggregate cost of the calls and the governor’s public agendas, but denied the rest of 
the records pursuant to Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-611(g), 10-618(b). When the 
newspaper brought suit, the Office of the Governor also argued that public disclosure was 
barred under Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-616(d), (i), 10-617(d), (e), and (f).  The 
Governor also argued a broad claim of executive privilege, which the court rejected.  Emily 
R. Sweet, Note, Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co.—The Hamilton Balancing 
Test Revisited: A Further Restriction on the Use of Executive Privilege Under the Public Information 
Act, 61 MD. L. REV. 961, 961–63 (2002). 
 64. Prince George’s County v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 322–23, 815 
A.2d 859, 878–79 (2003). 
 65. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f) (LexisNexis 2009).  
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trary to the public interest.”66  Investigations are included under Section 
10-618.67
The breadth of a custodian’s discretion in deciding whether to 
disclose is dependent upon the nature of the “public interest” at is-
sue.
 
68  First, a local ordinance can waive the custodian’s discretion as 
to permissible denials.69  Second, the burden of the custodian is typi-
cally reflective of the type of investigation held by the custodian, given 
that the “public interest” underlying “investigations” is often a con-
cern for non-interference with law-enforcement-type proceedings.70  
When a requested document is in the custody of a non-enumerated 
agency within the text of Section 10-618(f)(1), the custodian has both 
the burden of demonstrating that the organization was conducting an 
investigation and a particularized showing that disclosure would pre-
judice that investigation.71  When a requested document is in the cus-
tody of an enumerated agency,72
 
 66. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(a) (emphasis added).  See also Att’y General v. Gallagher, 
359 Md. 341, 353–54, 753 A.2d 1036, 1043 (2000) (stating that “Section 10-618 . . . is a dis-
cretionary provision”).  
 there is a presumptively valid law en-
 67. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f). 
 68. See Office of the State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118, 140–41, 737 
A.2d 592, 604 (1999) (holding that, whereas non-enumerated agencies under § 10-618 
need to make a particularized showing of public interest, enumerated agencies do not).  
 69. Caffrey v. Dep’t of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 305, 805 
A.2d 268, 287–88 (2002) (finding that “[t]he permissible denials of the MPIA are also sub-
ject to waiver by the County”).  
 70. See Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford County, 299 Md. 493, 508, 474 A.2d 880, 
888 (1984) (concluding that “the General Assembly did not intend to preclude generic 
determinations of interference when the circumstances were such that disclosure of the 
requested materials necessarily ‘would interfere’ with law-enforcement proceedings.”).  See 
also Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 75, 85, 716 A.2d 258, 262–
63, 268 (1998) (holding that the State Board of Dental Examiners failed to show that the 
Board’s investigation into a particular dental hygienist fell within the “investigations” ex-
ception of Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-618(f) (1997)). 
 71. Fioretti, 351 Md. at 75, 85, 716 A.2d at 262–63, 268.  See also Prince George’s County 
v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 332, 815 A.2d 859, 884 (2003) (permitting a 
custodian to deny disclosure of ongoing investigations under § 10-618(f) but ordering dis-
closure of closed investigations).  
 72. Those enumerated agencies are stated in Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-
618(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2009): 
(i) records of investigations conducted by the Attorney General, a State’s Attor-
ney, a city or county attorney, a police department, or a sheriff; 
(ii) an investigatory file compiled for any other law enforcement, judicial, cor-
rectional, or prosecution purpose; or 
(iii) records that contain intelligence information or security procedures of the 
Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, a city or county attorney, a police depart-
ment, a State or local correctional facility, or a sheriff. 
STATE GOV’T § 10-618 (f)(1). 
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forcement purpose.73  However, whereas a broad claim of public in-
terest by an enumerated agency would be sufficient to deny disclosure 
for an ongoing investigation, a closed investigation requires a particu-
larized factual basis to support such a denial.74
The statute similarly heightens the burden upon the custodian 
where the person requesting a document is a “person in interest.”
 
75  A 
“person in interest” respective to “investigations” is a person who “is 
the subject of a public record,”76 the quintessential example of which 
is a criminal defendant.77  Given this favored status, the custodian 
must point exactly to which of the seven enumerated exceptions in 
Section 10-618(f)(2) substantiates the custodian’s denial.78
(i) interfere with a valid and proper law enforcement pro-
ceeding; 
  If the per-
son requesting a document is a person in interest, a custodian may 
deny inspection “only to the extent that the inspection would:” 
(ii) deprive another person of a right to a fair trial or an im-
partial adjudication; 
(iii) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(iv) disclose the identity of a confidential source; 
(v) disclose an investigative technique or procedure; 
(vi) prejudice an investigation; or 
(vii) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.79
Therefore, when the requesting party is qualified as a person in inter-
est, the question “is not whether the reason for a § 10-618(f)(2) excep-
 
 
 73. Fioretti, 351 Md. at 75 n.7, 716 A.2d at 262 n.7; Office of State Prosecutor v. Judicial 
Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118, 140–41, 737 A.2d 592, 604 (1999).  See also Superintendent, Md. 
State Police v. Henschen, 279 Md. 468, 475, 369 A.2d 558, 562 (1977) (holding that doc-
uments requested from an agency enumerated in Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-618(f) 
need not be compiled for law enforcement or prosecution purposes for requested records 
to be exempt from disclosure). 
 74. City of Frederick v. Randall Family, LLC, 154 Md. App. 543, 567, 841 A.2d 10, 24, 
(2004) (finding that “where the police investigation is closed and where there is no danger 
that disclosure will interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings, a particularized 
factual basis for the ‘public interest’ denial must be put forth in order for the custodian of 
records to meet his/her burden of proof”).  See Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford 
County, 299 Md. 493, 511, 474 A.2d 880, 889 (1984) (finding that “the State is not re-
quired to make a particularized showing that the disclosure of investigatory police reports 
compiled for law-enforcement purposes to a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding 
would interfere with that pending criminal proceeding”).  
 75. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f)(2). 
 76. STATE GOV’T § 10-611(f)(1). 
 77. Blythe v. State, 161 Md. App. 492, 533, 870 A.2d 1246, 1269 (2005) (finding that a 
criminal defendant was the “person in interest”). 
 78. Id. at 531, 870 A.2d at 1268. 
 79. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).  
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tion must be shown . . . [t]he question, rather, is how may it be 
shown.”80
B.  Characterizing Intradepartmental Disciplinary Files 
 
The court’s characterization of the confidentiality bestowed 
upon intradepartmental disciplinary files has fluctuated, paralleling 
the manner in which police departments have denied disclosure.  
While police departments initially advocated the denial of intrade-
partmental investigatory files as a discretionary “investigation” deni-
al,81 they ultimately began arguing that such files constituted manda-
tory “personnel record” denials.82  Both the court and litigants have 
struggled with whether intradepartmental disciplinary files constitute 
“investigations” or “personnel files,” and with the source of such con-
fidentiality.83
Initially, the court did not have to directly address whether intra-
departmental disciplinary files constituted personnel records or inves-
tigations; rather, police departments denied disclosure based upon 
only the “investigations” exception.
 
84  Both the Court of Appeals in 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Maryland Committee Against the Gun Ban (“Gun 
Ban”)85 and the Court of Special Appeals in Briscoe v. Mayor Baltimore86 
found that when a litigant does not constitute a person in interest, 
there is a sufficient public interest in protecting both an officer from 
needless publicity and future investigations from possible inhibiting 
effects as to deny disclosure of an intradepartmental investigation.87
 
 80. Blythe, 161 Md. App. at 538, 870 A.2d at 1272. 
  
 81. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 86–87, 617 A.2d 
1040, 1044 (1993). 
 82. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 282–83, 857 A.2d 148, 153 
(2004).  
 83. Gun Ban, 329 Md. at 95–96, 617 A.2d at 1048. 
 84. See id. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1041.  See also Briscoe v. Mayor of Balt., 100 Md. App. 124, 
129, 640 A.2d 226, 229 (1994). 
 85. Gun Ban, 329 Md. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1041.  In Gun Ban, a political committee 
sought records generated in the course of an IID investigation that resulted from civilian 
complaints concerning the action of officers during the service of a subpoena.  Id. at 84, 
617 A.2d at 1042–43.  The director of the IID denied disclosure of the files, in part, be-
cause he considered the records to be investigations.  After first determining that the 
Committee was not a person in interest, the Court of Appeals held that the LEOBR pro-
vided an adequate public interest such that the IID custodian could permissibly deny dis-
closure of the requested records.  Id. at 95–96, 617 A.2d at 1048. 
 86. 100 Md. App. 124, 129, 640 A.2d 226, 228 (1994).  In Briscoe, an appellant sought 
an IID file, which the Baltimore City Police Department opened upon the appellant’s own 
request.  The department denied the request based upon the “investigations” exception.  
Id. at 126–27, 640 A.2d at 230. 
 87. Id. at 129–31, 640 A.2d at 229–30. 
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The Gun Ban court, in particular, rooted this public interest in the 
Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”).88  The court, 
however, did not have to directly consider whether the IID files con-
stituted strictly personnel records or investigations at the exclusion of 
the other because, in both cases, the police departments presented 
the requested documents as only investigations.89
Departments eventually changed their approach to handling 
MPIA disclosures, presenting intradepartmental investigations as per-
sonnel records, rather than investigations.
 
90  This change in tactics 
was gradual; rather than offering intradepartmental investigations as 
personnel records per se, the Prince George’s County Police Depart-
ment advocated that commanders’ information reports (“CIRs”) and 
duty rosters of police officers constituted both investigations and per-
sonnel records, concurrently.91  While the court ultimately rejected 
the department’s arguments regarding both the CIRs and the duty 
rosters, using the personnel records exception did mark a shift in the 
general tactics of police departments in denying disclosure.92  Ulti-
mately, in Baltimore City Police Department v. State (“BPD”), the Balti-
more City Police Department asserted that IAD files were personnel 
records.93  Baltimore Police Department grew out of a pre-trial order by 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that directed that portions of an 
officer’s IAD file be disclosed to a pair of criminal co-defendants.94
 
 88. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 95, 617 A.2d 1040, 
1048 (1993).  Though the Gun Ban court interpreted the 1992 version of the LEOBR, at 
the time codified as Md. Code Ann., art. 27 §§ 727 to 734, the LEOBR is still in effect.  MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-101 to 3-113 (LexisNexis 2011).  
  
The Court of Special Appeals found that the trial court had per-
formed an inadequate in camera review, and therefore reversed the 
 89. Gun Ban, 329 Md. at 94, 617 A.2d at 1047. 
 90. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 282–83, 857 A.2d 148, 153 
(2004).  
 91. Prince George’s County v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 316–17, 323–
24, 815 A.2d 859, 875, 879 (2003).  In this case, the Washington Post sought various police-
related documents including commanders’ information reports (“CIRs”), rosters of police 
officers, and intradepartmental disciplinary files compiled by the Prince George’s County 
Police Department’s Criminal Investigations Division (“CID”).  Id. at 289–300, 815 A.2d at 
864–66. Similar to the Baltimore City Police Department in both Gun Ban and Briscoe, the 
Prince George’s County Police Department argued that the CID files were exempt as “in-
vestigations.”  Rejecting the department’s argument, the Court of Special Appeals held 
that closed CID files did not carry a sufficient “public interest” by which to deny disclosure 
because there was no longer a danger that disclosure could inhibit the outcome of the in-
vestigation.  Id. at 332–33, 815 A.2d at 884–85. 
 92. Id. at 316–17, 323–24, 815 A.2d at 875, 879. 
 93. 158 Md. App. 274, 282–83, 857 A.2d 148, 153 (2004). 
 94. The requested IAD files related to allegations of dishonesty unrelated to the facts 
underlying the criminal trial of the defendant.  Id. at 277–78, 857 A.2d at 150. 
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case, allowing the co-defendants to seek a proper in camera review of 
the requested files.95  Because the case was determined based upon 
the in camera review, the court never reached the question of whether 
the records constituted “personnel files.”96
Following BPD, the question of what exactly constituted a per-
sonnel file, as opposed to an investigation record, in the context of an 
intradepartmental investigation was not explored again until Maryland 
Department of State Police v. Maryland State Conference of NAACP 
Branches.
 
97  The action spurred from a federal consent decree be-
tween the Maryland State Police (“MSP”) and the NAACP that re-
quired the MSP to combat racial profiling.98
[D]ocuments obtained or created in connection with any 
complaint of racial profiling, including but not limited to 
any complaint filed with or investigated by the MSP’s De-
partment or Internal Affairs, including all complaints filed, 
all documents collected or created during the investigation 
of each complaint, and all documents reflecting the conclu-
sion of each investigation.
  Upon growing suspi-
cious of the MSP’s cooperation, the NAACP filed a request under the 
MPIA, which included:  
99
After the MSP rejected the NAACP’s request on Section 10-616(i) 
grounds, the NAACP informed the MSP that the NAACP would ac-
cept a redacted version of the records with unique officer identifica-
tion numbers, rather than with the officers’ actual names.
  
100
 
 95. Id. at 291–92, 857 A.2d at 158. 
  Having 
failed to reach a consensus, the NAACP filed suit in the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County; though the court found that the documents in 
question were personnel records, the court ordered the documents 
 96. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 282–83, 857 A.2d 148, 153 
(2004). “The Department asserts that IAD’s file concerning its investigation into allega-
tions of dishonesty . . . qualifies as a personnel record, and appellee does not contend oth-
erwise.  Guided by Kirwan, we see no reason to disagree with the Department’s position on 
this point.”  Id. at 282–83, 857 A.2d at 153.  
 97. 190 Md. App. 359, 988 A.2d 1075 (2010), cert. granted 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 
(2010).  
 98. This order was part of a series of ongoing litigation between the NAACP and the 
State Police.  See generally Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 
72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999); Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197 (4th 
Cir. 2006); Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Md. State Police, 454 F. Supp. 2d 339 
(D. Md. 2006).   
 99. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 190 Md. App. at 362, 988 A.2d at 1077.  
 100. Id. at 363–64, 988 A.2d at 1077. 
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redacted101 and disclosed per the NAACP’s previous suggestion.102  
Both parties filed timely appeals to the Court of Special Appeals.  The 
only records at issue before the Court of Special Appeals were the in-
vestigative files concerning the racial profiling complaints made by 
the MSP, not the actual complaints to the MSP’s internal affairs divi-
sion.103
Confronted with the issue of whether the circuit court erred in 
finding the records in question were personnel files, the Court of 
Special Appeals held that the records were “investigations.”
  
104
It is illogical to believe that the General Assembly, when it 
adopted a permissible degree exception for “records of in-
vestigations conducted by . . . a police department,” . . . also 
intended that a custodian of records must withhold investi-
gatory files of a police department under the much more 
general “personnel record[s] of an individual” exception.
  Reject-
ing the MSP’s claim that the records were personnel files, the court 
stated:  
105
The court also noted the nature of the documents in question; 
they were neither indexed by employee name nor by identification 
number, but rather were kept in one location within the MSP’s Inter-
nal Affairs Office.
 
106  Observing that the Court of Appeals had recog-
nized the concept of “discipline” as somewhat indicative of personnel 
records,107 the Court of Special Appeals found that the records at is-
sue did not directly pertain to discipline because the records were 
neither stored in the officers’ files nor resulted in disciplinary ac-
tion.108  In his concurrence, Judge Kehoe further emphasized the par-
ticular nature of the documents in question as seeking to monitor the 
MSP’s supervision of its officers, rather than the job performance of 
the officers.109
 
 101. In order to avoid great expense in the redacting process, the court provided a pro-
cedure for disclosure, by which NAACP attorneys would review the records in unredacted 
form, and identify those records they wished the MSP to redact and disclose.  Id. at 365–66, 
988 A.2d at 1078–79. 
  Hence, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the por-
 102. Id. at 364–65, 988 A.2d at 1078.  
 103. Id. at 366–67, 988 A.2d at 1079. 
 104. Id. at 369–70, 988 A.2d at 1081. 
 105. Id. at 370, 988 A.2d at 1081. 
 106. Id. at 369, 988 A.2d at 1080. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 369, 988 A.2d at 1083. 
 109. Id. at 383–84, 988 A.2d at 1089 (Kehoe, J., concurring).  
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tion of the circuit court’s order that qualified the records in question 
as personnel records.110
C.  The LEOBR Has Served a Supporting Role in Engendering a Level of 
Confidentiality upon Intradepartmental Disciplinary Files 
 
The history of the confidentiality surrounding intradepartmental 
disciplinary files is inextricably linked to arguments utilizing the 
LEOBR.111  The LEOBR operates to guarantee certain procedural sa-
feguards to members of law enforcement agencies during any investi-
gation that could culminate in disciplinary action.112  These proce-
dural safeguards arise from an acknowledgement that “the nature of 
the duties of police officers is different from that of other public em-
ployees, [therefore] the establishment of different procedures cover-
ing any potential disciplinary action is justified.”113  While every in-
quiry regarding an officer’s conduct does not necessarily trigger the 
LEOBR, the officer is protected by the LEOBR from the inception of 
a disciplinary action.114
Among those procedural safeguards guaranteed to officers by the 
LEOBR is a right to be provided with certain investigatory informa-
tion upon the completion of the investigation and at least ten days be-
fore a hearing.
 
115  Pursuant to Section 3-104(n), the department must 
disclose the names of each witness, charge, and specification against 
the officer.116  The department must also provide the officer with a 
copy of the investigatory record and any exculpatory background held 
by the department, but only contingent upon the officer’s agreement 
to: “(1) execute a confidentiality agreement with the law enforcement 
agency not to disclose any material contained in the investigatory file 
and exculpatory information for any purpose other than to defend 
the law enforcement officer; and (2) pay a reasonable charge for the 
cost of reproducing the material.”117
 
 110. Id. at 381, 988 A.2d at 1087 (majority opinion). 
  The agency may also exclude 
any information containing the identity of a confidential source, non-
 111. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-101 to 3-113 (LexisNexis 2011).  
 112. Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep’t, 369 Md. 108, 122, 797 A.2d 770, 
778–79 (2002).  
 113. Cancelose v. City of Greenbelt, 75 Md. App. 662, 666, 542 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1988).  
 114. Fraternal Order of Police Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. v. Manger, 175 Md. 
App. 476, 497, 501, 929 A.2d 958, 970, 973 (2007).  
 115. PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n)(1). 
 116. PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n)(1)(i). 
 117. PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n)(ii). 
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exculpatory material, and instructions as to charges, disposition, or 
discipline.118
Given that Section 3-104(n) discusses confidentiality, depart-
ments attempted from an early stage to deny disclosure of intrade-
partmental disciplinary file information under the LEOBR.  As men-
tioned above,
 
119 the issue came before the Court of Appeals in Gun 
Ban.120  The court recognized that Section 728(b),121 a forerunner to 
the current Section 3-104(n),122 served to provide the department 
with a public interest in confidentiality sufficient to deny disclosure of 
the requested documents as an investigation.123  However, the court 
has made clear that the LEOBR does not engender the same degree 
of confidentiality when operating on its own.124  In Robinson v. State,125 
a defendant convicted of various crimes, including robbery and as-
sault with intent to murder, sought to obtain statements made to the 
Prince George’s County Police Department’s IAD regarding the inci-
dent in question.126  Among those arguments raised by the State in 
opposition to disclosure was that the statements were rendered confi-
dential by LEOBR, Section 728(b).127  Finding that the LEOBR did 
engender the files with some confidentiality, the Court of Appeals 
stated that the “confidentiality interest must be balanced, in this con-
text, against the confrontation and due process rights of the defen-
dant.”128  The court ultimately found that due process concerns out-
weighed those confidentiality interests.129
 
 118. PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n)(2). 
  Later, in BPD, the Court of 
Appeals elaborated upon the Robinson court’s opinion, stating that 
“the confidentiality protections . . . afforded [an officer under the 
LEOBR] . . . have been determined by the Court of Appeals to have 
very little bearing on the discoverability question we address in the 
 119. See supra Part II.B. 
 120. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 95, 617 A.2d 1040, 
1048 (1993).  
 121. MD. CODE (1957, 1992 REPL. VOL.) Art. 27, §§ 727–734D repealed by Acts 2003, c. 5, 
§ 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2003. 
 122. PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n). 
 123. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 124. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 283, 857 A.2d 148, 153 (2004). 
Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 308–09, 730 A.2d 181, 193 (1999). 
 125. 354 Md. 287, 730 A.2d 181. 
 126. Id. at 289, 292, 730 A.2d at 182–84. 
 127. MD. CODE (1957, 1992 REPL. VOL.) Art. 27, § 728, repealed by Acts 2003, c. 5, § 1, eff. 
Oct. 1, 2003. 
 128. Robinson, 354 Md. at 309, 730 A.2d at 193. 
 129. Id. at 311, 730 A.2d at 193–94. 
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case at bar.”130  Hence, the LEOBR buttressed the department’s per-
missible denial, thereby operating in a supportive role to the MPIA.131
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
In Montgomery County v. Shropshire, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
found that the IAD files concerning Shropshire and Parker-Loan were 
personnel files under the MPIA, thereby vacating the judgment of the 
circuit court and remanding the case for entry of declaratory judg-
ment for the officers.132  Judge Battaglia wrote the opinion of the 
court, in which she explored the source of an IAD file’s confidentiali-
ty.133  The parties presented the court with issues concerning the ef-
fect of both the MPIA134 and the LEOBR135 upon the IAD files.136  The 
court did not reach the issue of whether the LEOBR protected the 
files from disclosure because the court held that the IAD files consti-
tuted personnel files.137
The court held that Shropshire and Parker-Loan’s IAD files fell 
within the concept of personnel records because the files dealt direct-
ly with matters of the officers’ discipline.
  
138  Pointing to a lack of a sta-
tutory definition in the MPIA regarding personnel files, the court 
predominately centered its analysis upon case law.139  The court found 
that two previous cases, Kirwan v. The Diamondback140 and Office of the 
Governor v. Washington Post Co.,141
 
 130. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 283, 857 A.2d 148, 153 (2004). 
 in which the Court of Appeals held 
that parking violations and scheduling records were not personnel 
 131. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 95–96, 617 A.2d 
1040, 1048 (1993).   
 132. 420 Md. 362, 383–84, 23 A.3d 205, 218 (2011).  
 133. Id. at 378–83, 23 A.3d at 214–18. 
 134. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 10-616(i) & 10-618(f) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 135. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-101 to 3-113 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 136. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 378–83, 23 A.3d at 214–18.  In addition to the MPIA issue 
presented to the court, the Court of Appeals also examined the nature of the Montgomery 
County Inspector General’s role and powers, along with the nature of the Inspector Gen-
eral’s request.  Id. at 371–73, 23 A.3d at 211–12.  The court observed that the Inspector 
General had a role in “increas[ing] the legal, fiscal, and ethical accountability of County 
government departments and County-funded agencies” by conducting investigations.  Id. 
at 372, 23 A.3d at 211.  However, the court noted that while County government depart-
ments must comply with requests for information by the Inspector General, the Inspector 
General is still bound by “restrictions on public disclosure . . . required by . . . state law,” 
the MPIA.  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. Id. at 365 n.4, 23 A.3d at 207 n.4.   
 138. Id. at 378–79, 23 A.3d at 215. 
 139. Id. at 378–83, 23 A.3d at 214–18. 
 140. 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998). 
 141. 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000). 
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files, respectively, stood for the proposition that personnel files often 
deal with an employee’s disciplinary record.142  Moreover, the court 
reasoned that personnel files derive confidentiality from the fact that 
the pertinent disciplinary information personally identifies the subject 
of the file.143  In so doing, the court differentiated the IAD files in 
Shropshire from the files in question in Maryland Department of State Po-
lice v. Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches,144 in which the 
Court of Special Appeals held that disciplinary records were investiga-
tions, rather than personnel records, because the files in question 
were not indexed by name and stored in the aggregate.145  Therefore, 
the Shropshire IAD files constituted personnel files rather than investi-
gation records because the IAD files identified Shropshire and Parker-
Loan’s by name and dealt directly with disciplinary matters.146
In addition, the court predicated its decision to consider Shrop-
shire and Parker-Loan’s IAD files as personnel files upon issues of 
fairness.
 
147  The court highlighted its decision in Gun Ban, in which 
the court found that internal investigation files of “not sustained” 
complaints could not be disclosed under the MPIA “in the interests of 
fairness to the investigated officers as well as the integrity of the inves-
tigatory process.”148  The court found that such precedent stood for a 
“significant public interest in preserving the confidentiality of” both 
officers subject to investigation and the witnesses of those investiga-
tions.149  While the Shropshire court did not directly address the 
LEOBR, it did find that the statute’s requirement that investigated of-
ficers sign a confidentiality agreement before obtaining a copy of the 
IAD’s investigatory record150 reinforced a public interest in maintain-
ing the investigation’s confidentiality.151
In dissent, Judge Adkins found that the court’s decision impro-
perly frustrated the purpose of the MPIA because the public has a le-
  
 
 142. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 378–79, 23 A.3d at 215. 
 143. Id. at 381, 382, 23 A.3d at 216–17. 
 144. 190 Md. App. 359, 988 A.2d 1075 (2010), cert. granted 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 
(2010). 
 145. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 382–83, 23 A.3d at 217. 
 146. Id. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216–17.  The court noted that the IAD files in Shropshire con-
tained “no administrative violations” by the officers, and the court does not therefore “ad-
dress whether records of ‘sustained’ complaints may be disclosed to a County’s Inspector 
General.”  Id. at 374 n.12, 23 A.3d at 212 n.12. 
 147. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216–17. 
 148. Id. at 380, 23 A.3d at 216. 
 149. Id. at 380–81, 23 A.3d at 216. 
 150. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(n) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 151. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216. 
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gitimate interest in protecting against abuse by police officers.  Judge 
Adkins emphasized that the overarching goal of the MPIA is to facili-
tate disclosure, and the court’s previous decisions to interpret the 
MPIA in such a way to favor disclosure.152  Pointing to Maryland State 
Conference of NAACP Branches, Judge Adkins observed that the Court of 
Special Appeals ordered the disclosure of the State Police’s records 
because the public had a legitimate interest in preventing racial pro-
filing.153  Similarly, Judge Adkins found that prevention of police 
abuses is a public interest that merits the disclosure of IAD files.154  In 
juxtaposition to the court’s opinion, Judge Adkins found that the di-
vulgence of the officer’s identity did not defeat disclosure because it 
did not thwart the respective public interest at hand.155
Judge Adkins also emphasized the text of the MPIA, as opposed 
to the court’s focus on case law.  Judge Adkins found that the IAD 
files, as records of the police department’s internal investigation de-
partment, fell within the plain meaning of the MPIA’s designation of 
investigation records.
 
156  Contrastingly, the IAD files did not fall with-
in the three categories of personnel files enumerated by the MPIA: 
“(1) an application for employment; (2) performance rating; and (3) 
scholastic achievement.”157  Given that the IAD files fit squarely within 
the category of investigation records under the MPIA, Judge Adkins 
found disclosure proper because Montgomery County had otherwise 
directed county agencies and departments to comply with investiga-
tions by the Inspector General.158  Moreover, pointing to Gun Ban, 
Judge Adkins demonstrated that police departments themselves have 
argued that internal disciplinary files were investigation records, the-
reby supporting her argument that such files fall logically within the 
plain meaning of investigation files under the MPIA.159
Finally, Judge Adkins gave some consideration to the LEOBR, 
and found that the LEOBR would not thwart disclosure.
 
160  Citing to 
Robinson v. State,161
 
 152. Id. at 384, 23 A.3d at 218 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  
 Judge Adkins performed a balancing test, weighing 
 153. Id. at 386–87, 23 A.3d at 219–20 (citing Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Md. State Conf. 
of NAACP Branches, 190 Md. App. 359, 370–71, 988 A.2d 1075, 1081 (2010), cert. granted 
Maryland State Police v. NAACP Branches, 415 Md. 38 (2010)). 
 154. Id. at 387, 23 A.3d at 220. 
 155. Id. at 386–87, 23 A.3d at 219–20. 
 156. Id. at 388, 23 A.3d at 220. 
 157. Id. at 385–86, 23 A.3d at 219. 
 158. Id. at 389–90, 23 A.3d at 221. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 390–91 n.2, 23 A.3d at 222 n.2. 
 161. 354 Md. 287, 308, 730 A.2d 181, 192 (1999). 
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the police officer’s confidentiality interest against the public interest 
in transparency.162  Because the Inspector General’s office was created 
with the express purpose to prevent and detect government fraud and 
abuse, the Inspector General was acting as the government’s auditor 
of the IAD.163  Therefore, the officer’s confidentiality interests were 
not in danger because the risk that the Inspector General would, in 
turn, release the officers’ information did not outweigh the public in-
terest of disclosure.164  Judge Adkins found that the LEOBR did not 
act as an obstacle in preventing disclosure because the interest in gov-
ernment transparency outweighed the public interest in the officers’ 
confidentiality, given the improbability of the Inspector General dis-
closing Shropshire and Parker-Loan’s information to the public.165
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the officers’ 
IAD files fell within the mandatory denial provision of personnel 
records.  Rather, the IAD files fall within the plain meaning of the in-
vestigations permissible denial category.166  In its concern for officers’ 
privacy—particularly given that IAD harbors all complaints levied 
against an officer, founded or otherwise—the court “slotted” IAD files 
within the more stringent disclosure provision of personnel files.167  
The court could have reached the same outcome in this case by hold-
ing that the IAD files should not be disclosed as investigations subs-
tantiated by a public interest of confidentiality as derived from the 
LEOBR, thereby avoiding the nonsensical result of labeling IAD files 
as personnel records.168
A.  IAD Files Fall Logically Within the Meaning of the Investigations 
Permissible Denial Category Rather Than the Personnel Records 
Mandatory Denial Category 
 
The IAD files in question in Shropshire are more apt to fall under 
the permissible denial of “investigations” rather than the mandatory 
denial of “personnel records” relied upon by the court.  In dissent, 
 
 162. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 390–91 n.2, 23 A.3d at 222 n.2. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. See infra Part V.A. 
 167. See infra Part V.B. 
 168. See infra Part V.C. 
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Judge Adkins appropriately invoked the doctrine of ejusdem generis169 
to analyze Section 10-616(i) of the MPIA.170  Section 10-616(i) enu-
merates three categories of personnel records, “including an applica-
tion, performance rating, or scholastic achievement information.”171  
As Judge Adkins noted, “the type of records developed during an in-
vestigation, like the records at issue in this case, are a far cry from the 
three examples enumerated in the statute.”172
Whereas the IAD files do not fit a plain reading of Section 10-
616(i) personnel records, the files do fit a plain reading of Section 10-
618(f) investigations.  As a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, 
“[i]f the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, [the 
court] need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and [the court’s] 
analysis ends.”
  Hence, a common 
sense reading of Section 10-616(i) does not logically lead to the ma-
jority view that the IAD files are personnel records. 
173  Section 10-618(f)(1)(i) provides that “a custodian 
may deny inspection of . . . records of investigations conducted by . . . 
a city or county attorney, a police department, or a sheriff.”174  The Court 
of Appeals is not ignorant to this text, having already interpreted this 
enumeration to “negate[] the need for the agency to demonstrate 
that the files were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.”175  The-
reby, this enumeration carries import beyond merely demonstrating 
which agencies may deny disclosure under Section 10-618(f).  The 
IAD files at question in Shropshire were undeniably compiled by a 
county police department, and therefore patently came under the 
contemplation of Section 10-618(f).176
Furthermore, the public policy rationale behind the MPIA sup-
ports such a plain language analysis.
 
177  Both the MPIA itself178
 
 169. “[W]hen general words in a statute follow the designation of particular things or 
classes of subjects or persons, the general words will usually be construed to include only 
those things or persons of the same class or general nature as those specifically men-
tioned.”  Giant of Md. v. State’s Attorney, 274 Md. 158, 167, 334 A.2d 107, 113 (1975).  
 and 
 170. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 385, 23 A.3d 205, 219 (2011) 
(Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 171. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-616(i) (LexisNexis 2009).  
 172. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 385, 23 A.3d at 219. 
 173. Patterson Park Public Charter School, Inc. v. Balt. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174, 
198, 923 A.2d 60, 74 (2007).  
 174. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f)(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
 175. Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 80, 716 A.2d 258, 265 
(1998). 
 176. STATE GOV’T § 10-618(f)(1). 
 177. See Md. Unemployment Comp. Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 94, 36 A.2d 666, 670 
(1944) (finding that the court need not construe the language of the statute where anoth-
er meaning is clearly indicated by a contrary underlying policy). 
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the Court of Appeals acknowledge a public policy preference for dis-
closure.179  Whereas personnel records are mandatory exclusions 
from disclosure, investigations can be disclosed upon a showing of a 
public interest and with the custodian’s discretion.180
B.  The Shropshire Court Effectively Sought to Remedy a Practical 
Deficiency in the MPIA by “Shoehorning” IAD into Section 10-618(f)  
  Therefore, con-
sidering a policy preference for disclosure, the IAD files in question 
should be construed to fit the provision that furthers that preference: 
the permissible denial of investigations.  The Shropshire court cannot 
root its decision in the public policy underlying the MPIA; the IAD 
files in question fit under the investigations denial after conducting 
both a plain meaning and policy analysis.  
The Shropshire court’s concern with fairness toward investigated 
officers prompted it to adopt a practical, though improper, solution 
in interpreting IAD files as personnel records.  The court expressed 
concern for the fact that any report filed against an officer is con-
tained in the IAD report, regardless of the complaint’s merit.181  The 
plain language of the statute, however, does not lend itself to an in-
terpretation that would bring the IAD files under the mandatory 
denial of personnel records, thereby prompting the court to rely 
mainly upon the use of the term “discipline” by the court in Kirwan v. 
The Diamondback.182  In so doing, the Shropshire court violated a central 
tenet of interpretation: that the court should not insert words into a 
statute to change its meaning.  Therefore, despite its best intentions, 
the Shropshire court effectively violated its own doctrine.183
The court in Shropshire concerned itself at length with the issue of 
fairness to the officers investigated by the IAD, because their respec-
tive files contain all complaints alleged against the officers, regardless 
 
 
 178. STATE GOV’T § 10-612(a) (“All persons are entitled to have access to information 
about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.”).  
 179. Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 80, 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998). 
 180. See Att’y General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 353–54, 753 A.2d 1036, 1043 (2000) 
(discussing the different imperatives—permissible versus required—compelling disclosure 
in §§ 10-618(f) and 10-616(i), respectively). 
 181. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 381, 23 A.3d 205, 216–17 (2011) 
(majority opinion). 
 182. 352 Md. 74, 83, 721 A.2d 196, 200 (1998). 
 183. See Koons Ford of Balt., Inc. v. Lobach, 398 Md. 38, 62–63, 919 A.2d 722, 737 
(2007) (“The court’s charge in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the Leg-
islature, not to insert language to change the meaning of a statute.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 2012] MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. SHROPSHIRE 947 
of merit.184  The court emphasized its prior discussion in Mayor of Bal-
timore v. Maryland Committee Against the Gun Ban185 by quoting the Gun 
Ban court’s observation that “[m]istaken or even deliberately false re-
ports and accusations are made against members of the department” 
and “[i]n some instances, the most conscientious and hardworking 
members will be the subject of such reports.”186  While not delving in-
to such specificity, the Court of Special Appeals has similarly recog-
nized that subjects of an IAD report have a “privacy interest” in main-
taining its confidentiality.187
Faced with the difficulty of wanting to protect the private inter-
ests of officers within a counterintuitive statutory designation, the 
court justified its reasoning by clinging to the Kirwan court’s use of 
the word “discipline.”  Kirwan stands for the proposition that “per-
sonnel records” are documents that “directly pertain to employment 
and an employee’s ability to perform a job.”
  Hence, both the Court of Appeals and 
Court of Special Appeals have found an interest in maintaining the 
subject of an IAD investigation’s confidentiality. 
188  In choosing to focus 
upon the Kirwan court’s use of the word “discipline” rather than its 
central holding, the Shropshire court hued closely to the court in Office 
of the Governor v. Washington Post Co.,189 which, as the Court of Special 
Appeals pointed out, “was decided about two years after the Kirwan 
case . . . [and] for the first time, included the word ‘discipline’ in its 
judicially crafted definition of ‘personnel records.’”190
 
 184. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216–17.  
 In so doing, the 
Shropshire court preferenced the expanded definition of “personnel” 
 185. In Gun Ban, a political committee sought records generated in the course of an IID 
investigation that resulted from civilian complaints concerning the action of officers dur-
ing the service of a subpoena. 329 Md. 78, 84, 617 A.2d 1040, 1042–43 (1993).  The direc-
tor of the IID denied disclosure of the files, in part, because he considered the records to 
be investigations.  After first determining that the Committee was not a person in interest, 
the Court of Appeals held that the LEOBR provided an adequate public interest such that 
the IID custodian could permissibly deny disclosure of the requested records.  Id. at 95–96, 
617 A.2d at 1048. 
 186. Id. at 84, 617 A.2d at 1043. 
 187. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. State, 158 Md. App. 274, 286, 857 A.2d 148, 155 (2004) 
(stating in its analysis: “[w]e can only assume in the case before us that the trial court con-
cluded that appellee’s rights of confrontation and to a fair trial outweighed the privacy in-
terest Detective Dressel had in his personnel records” (emphasis added)).  
 188. Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 83, 721 A.2d 196, 200 (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 189. Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 548, 759 A.2d 249, 
264 (2000). 
 190. Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches, 190 Md. App. 
359, 373, 988 A.2d 1075, 1083 (2010), cert. granted, 415 Md. 38, 997 A.2d 789 (2010). 
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records in Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co. than the more 
narrowly tailored centralized holding in Kirwan.191
The Shropshire court’s reliance on Kirwan’s use of the term “dis-
cipline,” and Office of the Governor’s subsequent reliance thereon, is 
misplaced.  First, both the Shropshire
 
192 and Office of the Governor193 
courts erroneously attributed far too much weight to the Kirwan 
court’s use of the term “discipline.”194  The Kirwan court’s primary 
holding was largely an intrinsic discussion of the “personnel record” 
exception.195  In the passage that the subsequent courts utilize, how-
ever, the Kirwan court is simply applying its holding to the particular 
case of Coach Williams: “Records of tickets issued by the campus po-
lice do not relate to Coach William’s hiring, discipline, promotion, 
dismissal, or any matter involving his status as an employee.”196  Not 
only do the Shropshire and Office of the Governor courts misapprehend 
this application of the Kirwan court’s statement of the rule, but those 
subsequent courts commit a logical fallacy by taking an exemplary 
application and turning it into a requirement: if the record deals with an 
employee’s discipline, then it is a personnel record.197
As previously discussed, the policy of the Public Information 
Act is to allow access to public records.  Generally, the sta-
tute should be interpreted to favor disclosure.  In light of 
this policy, we do not believe that the General Assembly in-
tended that any record identifying an employee would be 
exempt from disclosure as a personnel record.  Instead, the 
General Assembly likely intended that the term “personnel 
records” retain its common sense meaning.
  However, to treat 
another object in the series from which the courts extracted the term 
“discipline”—for example, if the record deals with “any matter involving 
his status as an employee,” then it is a personnel record—would be directly 
contrary to the Kirwan court’s statement: 
198
Hence, to treat any of those other objects in the Kirwan court’s appli-
cative series as wholly indicative of a personnel record would be to 
 
 
 191. See id. at 373, 988 A.2d at 1083 (describing the interplay between the definitional 
difference of personnel files and investigations as defined in Kirwan, 352 Md. at 83, 721 
A.2d at 200).  
 192. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 378–79, 23 A.3d 205, 215 (2011). 
 193. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 548, 759 A.2d at 264. 
 194. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200.  
 195. Id. at 82–83, 721 A.2d at 200. 
 196. Id. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200. 
 197. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 378–79, 23 A.3d at 215. 
 198. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 84, 721 A.2d at 200. 
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contravene the Kirwan court itself, thereby demonstrating the Kirwan 
court could not have intended for that application to be included 
within the central holding of the case.199
Second, the Shropshire court used the Kirwan opinion to effective-
ly insert the term “discipline” into Section 10-616(i), thereby chang-
ing its meaning.  The Court of Appeals has held that a court should 
not insert language into a statute to change its meaning.
 
200  In this 
case, by placing so much emphasis on the Kirwan court’s use of “dis-
cipline,” the Shropshire court effectively read the term “discipline” into 
Section 10-616(i).201  In so doing, the court assumedly is attempting to 
protect the privacy interests of the officer, about which it has demon-
strated concern; hence, Shropshire very well may be the product of the 
practical concern for the officer’s privacy.202  Nevertheless, both the 
statute’s words and the policy behind the MPIA reflect a contrary re-
sult.203  Additionally, the Shropshire court’s analysis ignored the fact 
that alleged misconduct of a police officer that would prompt an IAD 
investigation would also likely impinge upon constitutional rights.204  
In other words, a government employee performing clerical duties 
may misplace a document and such an oversight would be worthy of 
note in a personnel file; contrastingly, a police officer who misplaces a 
police report may commit a Brady violation and by its very nature 
spawn an investigation.205  Therefore, the Shropshire court should have 
refrained from materially changing the meaning of 10-616(i) by read-
ing discipline into the statute.206
 
 199. Id., 721 A.2d at 200–01. 
 
 200. Koons Ford of Balt., Inc. v. Lobach, 398 Md. 38, 62–63, 919 A.2d 722, 737 (2007) 
(citations omitted). 
 201. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 378–79, 23 A.3d 205, 215 (2011) 
(stating that “[w]e . . . determined that personnel records were those relating to hiring, 
discipline, promotion, dismissal, or any matter involving an employee’s status.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 202. Id. at 380–81, 23 A.3d at 216.  
 203. See supra Part III.A. 
 204. See Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 304, 730 A.2d 181, 190 (1999) (explaining that a 
“police department [is] an arm of the prosecution,” and thereby a department has the 
same duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to release exculpatory evidence to 
a criminal defendant).   
 205. Id.  See also Corinne M. Nastro, Note, Strickler v. Greene: Preventing Injustice by Pre-
serving the Coherent “Reasonable Probability” Standard to Resolve Issues of Prejudice in Brady Viola-
tion Cases, 60 MD. L. REV. 373, 377–382 (2001) (discussing Brady in the context of Maryland 
jurisprudence).    
 206. Koons Ford of Balt., Inc. v. Lobach, 398 Md. 38, 62–63, 919 A.2d 722, 737 (2007) 
(citations omitted). 
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C.  The Court Should Have Recognized the IAD Files as “Investigations,” 
With a Public Interest in Denying Disclosure Pursuant to the LEOBR 
The same result reached by the Shropshire court—denying the 
disclosure of IAD files—could be accomplished by recognizing intra-
departmental files as investigations, the denial of which is substan-
tiated by the LEOBR.  Gun Ban serves as an example of how the 
LEOBR can be utilized to validate denial of disclosure under the 
proper designation of investigations, rather than the improper blan-
ket denial of personnel records.207  As discussed above, denying dis-
closure of an “investigation”—especially in the case of “closed” files—
requires a public interest;208 assumedly, the Shropshire court adopted 
the “personnel records” interpretation of IAD so as to firmly deny the 
disclosure of files that contain even superfluous complaints against 
possibly the most “conscientious and hardworking members” of the 
department.209  Gun Ban, however, reached the same conclusion using 
the LEOBR as a viable public interest to substantiate the permissible 
denial under the investigations exception: “That there is a public in-
terest in the confidentiality of investigations of police officers is dem-
onstrated by the provisions of LEOBR . . . [c]ontrary to the Commit-
tee’s contention, the public interest in the confidentiality of 
investigations is broader than protecting the identity of confidential 
sources.”210  Applied to the IAD files in Shropshire, the LEOBR could 
have served as the same viable public interest by which to deny disclo-
sure, without having to nonsensically “slot” an investigation file under 
the personnel records exception, instead of under the investigations 
exception.211
Curiously, while the Shropshire court went to great lengths to qual-
ify the IAD files in question as personnel files, it substantiated its 
claim similar to that of how an investigations exception would: it iden-
tified a public interest as derived from the LEOBR.
 
212
 
 207. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 80, 617 A.2d 1040, 
1041 (1993). 
  Given the 
mandatory nature of the personnel files exception, those documents 
attributed that designation are thought to have an inherent public in-
terest against disclosure, and therefore there is no need for the custo-
 208. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 209. Montgomery County v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 380–81, 23 A.3d 205, 216 (2011) 
(quoting Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 84, 617 A.2d 
1040, 1043 (1993)). 
 210. Gun Ban, 329 Md. at 95, 617 A.2d at 1048. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216–17. 
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dian to proffer such an interest.213
[W]here, as here, an investigation clears the officers of 
wrongdoing, there is a significant public interest in maintain-
ing confidentiality, both in fairness to the investigated offic-
ers and cooperating witnesses.  This policy is embodied 
in Section 3-104(n) of the Public Safety Article, which states 
that an investigated officer must “execute a confidentiality 
agreement” before obtaining a copy of his or her investiga-
tory file at the close of an investigation.
  Nevertheless, the Shropshire court 
offered the LEOBR as indicative as a requisite public interest: 
214
Hence, the Court of Appeals treated the IAD files as if they were investi-
gations, pursuant to Section 10-618(f).  While there is no logical rea-
son for attributing a public interest to personnel records, it is general-
ly requisite for permissible denials under investigations.
 
215
V.  CONCLUSION 
  Hence, the 
Inspector General could have been denied the officers’ IAD files un-
der the more logical construct of investigations, with a public interest 
rooted firmly in the LEOBR, rather than classify the documents as 
personnel records.  
In Montgomery County v. Shropshire, the Court of Appeals chose to 
embrace a nonsensical approach to the confidentiality of intrade-
partmental disciplinary files, despite the fact that another, more logi-
cal, option was available that would have accomplished the same 
goal.216  Instead of holding that the IAD files in question qualified as 
“personnel records,” the court should have interpreted the files as 
“investigations.”217  Understandably, the court was concerned with the 
personal privacy of police officers;218 however, the court could have 
accomplished the same end of nondisclosure by acknowledging the 
IAD files in question fell within the plain meaning of “investiga-
tions,”219
 
 213. See generally Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 82–84, 721 A.2d 196, 200 
(1998). 
 the disclosure of which would have been proscribed by a 
public interest in confidentiality as provided in the Law Enforcement 
 214. Shropshire, 420 Md. at 381, 23 A.3d at 216 (emphasis added). 
 215. Mayor of Balt. v. Md. Comm. Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 94–95, 617 A.2d 
1040, 1047–48 (1993). 
 216. See supra Part V.C. 
 217. See supra Part V.A. 
 218. See supra Part V.B. 
 219. See supra Part V.A. 
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Officers’ Bill of Rights.220  Hence, the court should have interpreted 
investigations to include intradepartmental disciplinary files, while 
still denying the disclosure of those files.221
 
 
 
 220. See supra Part V.C. 
 221. See supra Part V.A. 
